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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal from a judgment and commitment for the
crimes

of

aggravated

burglary,

a

first

degree

aggravated sexual assault, a first degree felony.

felony,

and

Counsel herein

was appointed after the case was "poured over" to the Utah Court
of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
POINT I

WAS THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY
VIOLATED?

POINT II

WHETHER
THE
REASONABLE
DOUBT
INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE COURT OVER
DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION
FAILED
TO
ADEQUATELY DEFINE THE CONCEPT OF
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE JURY.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides as follows:

In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of counsel for
his defence.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides as
follows:
In criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf,
to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have
a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have
been committed, and the right to
appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights
herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
STATEMENT OF THE QAgE
1.

Nature of the Case.

Defendant was convicted of

aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, and aggravated sexual
assault, a first degree felony. The Court sentenced the defendant
2

to the indeterminate terms of from five years to life on those
convictions.

From that judgment and commitment, the defendant

filed this appeal.
2.

Course of Proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of

aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, and aggravated sexual
assault, a first degree felony. The Court sentenced the defendant
to the indeterminate terms of from five years to life on those
convictions.

From that judgment and commitment, the defendant

filed this appeal.
After the case was in the appellate court, the Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of
taking evidence to determine whether or not the defendant's right
to testify was violated at the trial court.

A hearing on that

issue occurred on July 17, 1991, before the Honorable James S.
Sawaya.

Those proceedings have been filed with the Court of

Appeals, and that issue is before this Court.
3.

Disposition

of

Trial

Court.

On

defendant's

convictions for two first degree felonies, the Court sentenced the
defendant to the indeterminate term of from 5 years to life in the
Utah State Prison.

On remand from this Court for evidentiary

hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant's right to
testify was not violated, and issued such an order.
4.

Relevant

Facts.

The victim

testified

that she

encountered a man in the late afternoon near her apartment.

The

man was black, carrying a child on his shoulders, wearing a green
t-shirt and jeans, and had an unusual hair style.
3

[Record, pp.

70-72, 96]

He introduced himself to the victim as "Brooks" or

"Brock" and said something to the effect that he could "shine some
of his love to me."
defendant

[R. , pp. 73]

in the courtroom

afternoon.

The victim identified the

as the man she encountered that

[R., p. 70]

In the early hours of the following morning, the victim
was awakened by a man bending over her "kissing her."

[R., p. 74]

He had his hand behind her neck and was touching her breast and
buttocks underneath her robe.

[R., p. 75] The man indicated that

she should be quiet and get up and go with him.
began struggling and screaming, Id.
daughter.

He held

the victim

by

id.

The victim

The man struck the victim's
the hair

and

struck her

approximately a dozen times in the face with his hand.
76]

[R. , p.

The man also kicked the victim in the face several times.

[R., p. 77]

The victim's face was yellow and swollen for over a

month and she had a black eye.

[R. , pp. 84, 120]

Photographs

were submitted of the victim which were taken the day following
the attack.

[R., p. 83]

According to the victim's testimony, the assailant also
made several threats to the effect of "you're dead", "you and your
kids are dead", "I'm going to kill you", "your kids are dead",
"this is what the coke will do for you, bitch."
9-12].

[R., pp. 77, 1.

The assailant then went to the door, unlocked it and left,

leaving the door open.

[R., p. 77]

The victim described the man

as wearing a greenish t-shirt, Levis, and having an unusual
braided hair style.

[R., pp. 80-81]
4

The police arrived shortly thereafter. After talking with
the victim, Officer Knight testified that he went to apartment no.
3 and spoke with Walt, a witness to the victim's afternoon
encounter with "Brook" or "Brock".
to the defendant's apartment.

Walt directed Officer Knight

[R., p. 186.]

The police were

admitted into the defendant's apartment, where they discovered him
and arrested him.

Officer Knight testified that defendant was

wearing a green t-shirt.

[R., pp. 187-188]

The defendant was

hand-cuffed, brought to the police car and placed in front of the
headlights.

[R., p. 189]

brought to the area.

The victim and her roommate were

Both the victim and her roommate identified

the defendant as the assailant.

[R., pp. 81, 148, 217-281]

The

State also presented the testimony of the victim's roommate,
Shannon Radford.
victim's testimony.

Her testimony substantially corroborated the
[R., pp. 140-160]

Additionally, she testified that she watched the assailant
leave the apartment from the window.

When he was about 15 feet

away, he stopped, turned, and looked at her.
hair style and the green t-shirt.
also identified the defendant

She described his

[R., pp. 144-146] This witness
in the courtroom after viewing

photos taken of him shortly after the arrest.

[R., p. 149-51]

At the remand hearing, the defendant testified that he
wanted to testify but was prevented from testifying by his trial
counsel.

[Tr. of Hearing, July 17, 1991, p. 4-11]

Co-trial

counsel for the defendant testified that the defendant wanted to
testify and had maintained he wanted to testify throughout the
5

trial.

[Tr. of Hearing, July 17, 1991, p. 13]

He further

testified that it was trial counsel's belief that the defendant
ought not testify and indicated that the defendant was not happy
with that advice.

[Tr. of Hearing, July 17, 1991, p. 14] Counsel

also testified at the hearing that trial counsel did not "let him
testify" and he acquiesced

in trial counsel's advice not to

testify because he had no option, as trial counsel had indicated
they were not going to "put him on the stand".

[Tr. of Hearing,

July 17, 1991, p. 15] Lead trial counsel testified at the hearing
that when it became time to decide whether or not the defendant
should testify, she expressed to the defendant her opinion that
the State's case was weak and the defendant could add nothing, and
that based upon that advice, he said "ok".

[R., pp. 21-22]

She

further testified that the reason two lawyers represented Mr.
Brooks at the trial was not due to the nature of the charges, but
because "Mr. Brooks was a difficult client", and that co-counsel
was there as a go between who had direct contact with Mr. Brooks
during the trial.

[Tr. of Hearing, July 17, 1991, p. 22-23] Lead

counsel also testified that no time had been spent preparing Mr.
Brooks to testify.

[Tr. of Hearing, July 17, 1991, p. 24]
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT

The defendant in a criminal trial, as created by the Utah
Constitution, has the individual right to testify.

This right is

different than and more expanded than the federal counterpart as
contained in the Sixth Amendment.

This personal fundamental right

cannot be presumed to have been waived by a "silent record".
6

In

order to find a waiver, the trial court must have a personal
dialogue with the defendant regarding that right out of the
presence of a jury.
The reasonable doubt instruction as given by the Court did
not adequately define "reasonable doubt".
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY AS
CONTAINED IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 WAS
VIOLATED WHEN THE DEFENDANT DID NOT
TESTIFY, DESPITE HIS REQUEST TO HIS
LAWYERS TO TESTIFY AND WAIVER CANNOT
BE PRESUMED FROM A SILENT RECORD
BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT
INVOLVED.
The United States Supreme Court, in Rock v. Arkansas, 483

U.S. 444, 49-52, (1987) held that "an accused's right to present
his

own

version

fundamental

to

of
a

events

personal

in

his

defense

own

words

than

the

is

even

more

right

to

self-

representation ."
This Supreme Court in Rock located that right in the due
process clause and the compulsory process clause of the Sixth
Amendment.

It also indicated that it is a "necessary corollary to

the Fifth Amendment's

guarantee against compelled

testimony."

Since the "right to testify" is one of those "fundamental rights",
that right to testify should be deemed waived only when there is
record evidence demonstrating "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."

Johnson v. Zurbst,

304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
The Federal Constitution, as articulated in Rock, supra.,
found the origin of the right to testify in the Sixth Amendment
7

compulsory process clause.

Under federal analysis, pursuant to

Rock, the United States Supreme Court held that a person's right
to present evidence through his "own words was more fundamental
than

even

the

right

to

counsel,"

as

well

as

other

known

fundamental rights.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, in Boyd v. U.S., 48 Cr.L., 1459 (1991) explained the
federal analysis of the right to testify, pursuant to Rock.

In

Boyd, defendant did not testify, but there was no "on the record"
dialogue between the defendant and the court regarding waiver.
That court held that "the defendant's right to testify in a
criminal trial is a fundamental and personal right that can only
be waived by the defendant."
Requiring that the trial court "engage in an on the record
discussion with the defendant to ensure that she has knowingly
waived her right to testify."
Other state courts have followed this requirement.

See

example, People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 503, 514 (Colo. S.Ct. 1984)
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Buonadonna, 48 Cr.L.,
1377 held that a Bruton violation
statement

by

a non-testifying

(incriminating unredactable

co-defendant)

was

not

of the

fundamental variety, and therefore, did not require an "on the
record" dialogue between the defendant and the court, and may be
presumed from silence or may be waived by trial counsel.
The important inquiry appears to be whether or not the
right to testify is of the fundamental variety.
8

If it is of that

fundamental variety, then it may not be presumed from silence or
waived by counsel, but the court must assure itself, as it does
with other fundamental rights, that the defendant understands and
is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to testify.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides in
relevant parts: "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person. . . ."

The Utah

Supreme Court, in State v. LaRocco, 135 Ut.Adv.Rptr. 16 (1990), in
ruling

on

a

search

and

seizure

issue, held

that

the Utah

Constitution may provide a "somewhat different construction than
its federal

counterpart,

based

upon the

context

of the two

documents."
The federal constitution and the Rock, supra, analysis
derives its viability from the Sixth Amendment and the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
specific.

The Utah Constitution is

Its language is specific and relies specifically to

criminal defendants, in Article I, Section 12.
Under the Utah Constitutional analysis, the defendant's
personal right to testify was infringed and could not have been
waived by counsel, and this case should be remanded for a new
trial on that basis.
POINT II

THE REASONABLE
DOUBT
INSTRUCTION
FAILED TO ADEQUATELY DEFINE THE
CONCEPT OF REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE
JURY.

An appeal challenging the trial court's refusal to give
jury instructions presents a question of law.

Therefore, no

deference need be given by the reviewing court to the trial
9

judge's decision.
Ct.App. 1990).

State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Utah

The trial court in this case probably did not err

in refusing to give the reasonable doubt instruction submitted by
the defense.

R. 263-64.

In making her request, the defense

relied on State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147-49 (Utah 1989), in
which a majority of the court adopted the analysis set forth by
Justice Stewart in his dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375,
1380-82 (Utah 1989).
The court

R. 263.

in Johnson held

that an

instruction which

defined reasonable doubt in terms of making important or weighty
decisions in the juror's own lives was inappropriate because it
tends to "diminish and trivialize the constitutionally required
burden-of-proof standard."

774 P.2d at 1148.

The court further

held it impermissible to instruct that reasonable doubt is not
merely

a

possibility.

The

court

reasoned

that

under

some

circumstances, a possibility very well may constitute reasonable
doubt.

Whether or not it does depends upon the likelihood of the

possibility.

Id.

The instruction given by the trial court in this case is
as follows:
All presumptions of law, independent of
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of
a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is
satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an
acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that
upon the State to prove the defendant
a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond
doubt does not require proof to
10

the burden is
guilty beyond
a reasonable
an absolute

certainty.
Now by reasonable doubt is meant a
doubt that is based on reason and one which is
reasonable in view of all the evidence. It must
be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the
mind, convinces the understanding of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a
doubt which reasonable men and women would
entertain, and it must arise from the evidence or
the lack of evidence in this case.
Applying the standards set forth in Johnson above, the Utah
Court of Appeals, in State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1331-33
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) upheld an identically worded instruction.
Quoting Justice Stewart's dissent in Ireland, the court held it
permissible to instruct that a "fanciful or wholly speculative
possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. at 1332 (quoting State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1382 (Utah
1989) (Stewart J., dissenting)).

The court also held that an

instruction need not specifically negate the "weighty decisions of
life" analogy struck down in Johnson.
that type was sufficient.

Simply omitting language of

Id.

However, an argument could be made requesting the court to
reconsider the approval of the instruction in Pedersen in light of
the failure of the instruction to adequately define reasonable
doubt. In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. —

(1990), the United States

Supreme Court reversed a capital homicide conviction because the
reasonable doubt instruction was constitutionally defective.

The

court in Cage held that an instruction defining reasonable doubt
in terms of a "grave uncertainty," "an actual substantial doubt"

11

or a "moral certainty" suggested a higher degree of doubt necessary
for acquittal, thus allowing jurors to find guilt on a degree of
proof below that required under the Due Process Clause.
A broad interpretation of Cage supports the argument that
"reasonable doubt" is not self-defining.

The Court

in Cage

reviewed the instruction by construing it as a whole and as jurors
could have understood

it in its entirety.

By rejecting the

definitions of "moral certainty" and "actual substantial doubt",
and then striking down the entire instruction, the court was
implicitly stating that due process requires an instruction which
provides a meaningful, accurate definition of reasonable doubt.
An adequate definition of reasonable doubt is vital if it is to
serve its function as a "prime instrument for reducing the risk of
convictions resting on factual error."

Cage, supra.

(quoting In

re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)).
The instruction in Cage was similar to the one used by the
trial court in this case.

Both repeat the usage of the term

"reasonable doubt" in order to define the concept of reasonable
doubt.

These

instructions

amount

to nothing

more

than the

statement, "reasonable doubt is a doubt which is reasonable."
Consequently, the instruction given in this case fails to give the
jury any guidance.

It does not provide a meaningful definition of

the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" and is therefore defective.
Additionally, the evidence in this case consisted almost
entirely of an eyewitness identification of the appellant at a
show-up and a subsequent in-court identification where appellant
12

was the only black man in the room.

Because the jury was made

aware of the inherent unreliability of these types of eyewitness
identifications, had they been adequately instructed on the concept
of reasonable doubt, they may well have acquitted appellant of the
charge.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant is entitled to a new
trial and the case should be remanded for a new trial.
DATED this

day of October, 1991.

KENNETH R. BROWN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of October, 1991, a

true and correct copy of Appellant's Brief was mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Attorney General's Office
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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ATT. 1, 9 V
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(a) persons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is
substantial evidence to support the new felony
charge; or
(c) persons charged with a crime, as defined by
statute, when there is substantial evidence to
support the charge and the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the person would
constitute a substantial danger to self or any
other person or to the community or is likely to
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on
bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal only as prescribed by law.
1989
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail a n d fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
1896

Sec. 10. [Trial b y jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.
1896
Sec. 11. [Courts o p e n — R e d r e s s of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party.
1896
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be competed to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
1896

Sec. 13. [Prosecution b y information or indictment — Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with

VI

yj

X X XX A

•±£0

the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature.
1949

Sec. J 4, [Unreasonable
searches forbidden —
Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
1898
Sec. 15. [Freedom of s p e e c h a n d of the press —
Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party
shall b$ acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
i896
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in
cases of absconding debtors.
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to b e free — Soldiers voting.]
All ejections shaft be free, and no power, civil or j
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time .
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law.
Sec. 18. [Attainder — E x post facto l a w s — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

1
J
j
J

1896

Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act.
is*
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil
power.]
,
The military shall be in strict subordination to the
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be
quartered in any house without the consent of the
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to be
prescribed by law.
i*#
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall
have bfeen duly convicted, shall exist within this
State.
1896
~- r i

Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] v^i
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
1896
public use without just compensation.

Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] M
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably a n y *
franchise, privilege or immunity.
189* B

fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT VII
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI
AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-

[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIH
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX
[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.
AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENT XI
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial
power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United ;
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XII

J

[Election of President and Vice-President.]
j
The Electors shall meet in their respective states,,!
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 1
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of J
the same state with themselves; they shall name in ^
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in J
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-|
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons J
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 1
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,-J
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 1
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United j
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The>M
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the3
Senate and House of Representatives, open all &eM
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—TheJ
person having the greatest number of votes for Pres1 'M
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ^'M
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and«
if no person have such majority, then from the V&'M
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three*
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